Informal Employment Relationships and the Labor Market:

Is there Segmentation in Ukraine? by Lehmann, Hartmut & Pignatti, Norberto
 ISSN 2282-6483 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Informal Employment Relationships 
and the Labor Market: 
Is there Segmentation in Ukraine? 
 
Hartmut Lehmann 
Norberto Pignatti 
 
 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N°1117 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
Informal Employment Relationships and the Labor Market:  
Is there Segmentation in Ukraine?1 
Hartmut Lehmann (University of Bologna, IZA and DIW) 
Norberto Pignatti (International School of Economics at Tbilisi State University and IZA) 
 
January 2018 
 
Abstract  
One of the most important factors that determine individuals’ quality of life and wellbeing is their 
position in the labor market and the type of jobs that they hold. When workers are rationed out of the 
formal segment of the labor market against their will, i.e., the labor market is segmented, their quality 
of life is limited, and their wellbeing is reduced. When they can freely choose between a formal or 
informal employment relationship, i.e., the labor market is integrated, their wellbeing can reach high 
levels even in the presence of informal employment. We, therefore, test whether the Ukrainian labor 
market is segmented along the formal-informal divide, slicing the data by gender and age. The analysis 
that we perform consist in the analysis of short-term and medium-term transitions between five 
employment states, unemployment and inactivity. We also analyze wage gaps of mean hourly earnings 
and across the entire hourly earnings distribution, controlling for time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity. According to our results segmentation is present for dependent employees: for a large 
part of informal employees informal employment is used as a waiting stage to enter formal salaried 
employment and is not voluntarily chosen. As far as self-employment is concerned the evidence is 
mixed regarding in the Ukrainian labor market. This heterogeneity in outcomes implies that not all 
informal work is associated with a low quality of life and reduced wellbeing in post-transition 
economies. 
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Informal Employment Relationships and the Labor Market: Is there Segmentation in Ukraine? 
 
1. Introduction 
The quality of life of individuals depends on many factors, very prominent among them individuals’ 
position in the labor market and the kind of jobs that they hold. For many social scientists stable 
employment in formal jobs is associated with life satisfaction and a high quality of life. Such a view is, 
however, not universal in the economics literature on formal and informal employment in developing 
and post-transition countries. Some authors put forth the proposition that conditional on workers’ 
characteristics many workers have higher utility when they are informal wage employees or informally 
self-employed. Those who consider formal jobs as superior along many dimensions perceive the labor 
market as segmented. In this view, formal jobs are good jobs since they provide high wages, good 
working conditions, employment protection and insurance against unforeseen health or employment 
shocks. However, because of labor market institutions and policies the access to good jobs is rationed 
and some workers are unlucky and have to queue in informal jobs, which do not have any of the good 
characteristics of formal jobs, before they can enter the formal sector. A competing view sees the labor 
market as integrated, with individuals selecting themselves into that segment of the labor market that 
generates highest utility for them. Understanding the nature of jobs along the formal-informal divide is, 
therefore, important if one wants to assess social welfare and subjective wellbeing in developing and 
post-transition countries. 
 The empirical literature on labor market segmentation usually proposes two types of “tests”, the 
analysis of transition probabilities between labor market states that include informal employment, as 
well as the analysis of formal-informal wage gaps at the mean, and in more recent studies, across the 
entire earnings distribution. When we discuss this literature regarding post-transition countries below, 
we will see that most of the studies are plagued by relatively poor data that limit the scope of the analysis 
or that require unrealistic assumptions. This paper uses a data set that is less limiting, the Ukrainian 
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Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS). 2 It allows us to make precise distinctions between different 
types of informal employment and it has a panel dimension that straddles the years 2003 to 2007.3 This 
latter feature enables us to establish medium-term effects of transitions between different types of 
employment and other labor market states as well as provide precise point estimates of fixed effects 
wage gap regressions. Most of the literature on labor market segmentation in post-transition countries 
uses two-year panels and is not able to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary informal 
employment relationships, something we are able to do with the ULMS data. Our analysis will also 
provide a comparative perspective by contrasting our results for Ukraine with the results presented in 
the literature for other post-transition countries. Given the high quality of the ULMS data our paper will 
contribute to this literature in a substantial way for at least two reasons. First, we explore whether labor 
market segmentation plays out differently for female and male workers in Ukraine. Second, in spite of 
a relatively short panel, new methods in fixed effects quantile regressions enable us to provide consistent 
estimates of formal-informal wage differentials across the entire earnings distribution in the presence 
of unobserved heterogeneity.  
 Thus far we only briefly sketched the two main schools of thought regarding the role of informal 
employment. In the next section, we, therefore, discuss these two main paradigms in the literature on 
informality and informal employment and labor market segmentation plus a third paradigm in more 
detail. This is followed by a survey of the empirical literature testing for labor market segmentation, 
with an exclusive focus on the research related to post-transition economies. The fourth section then 
presents the ULMS data, gives some descriptive statistics and discusses our research strategy. In section 
five we show our main results, highlighting estimated transition probabilities between labor market 
states that include different types of informal employment as well as estimates of wage gap regressions 
                                                            
2 For a detailed description of the ULMS see Lehmann, Muravyev and Zimmermann (2012). 
3 In this paper we only use three waves of the ULMS, 2003, 2004 and 2007, when the Ukrainian economy experienced 
continuous strong growth. We exclude the fourth wave (2012) from the analysis since it was collected after the Great 
Recession hit Ukraine very hard. 
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and quantile wage gap regressions that include fixed effects. The final section discusses our results in 
the light of the literature and gives some conclusions. 
 
2. The literature on informality and informal employment: theoretical considerations  
The existence of the informal segment of the labor market alongside the formal sector and the reasons 
posited for its existence have given rise to several paradigms in the literature. One key question in the 
labor market literature for developing countries is whether informal employment or self-employment 
reflects voluntary choice or is involuntary due to rationing in the labor market (Guasch 1999). The 
traditional dualistic view, going back to Harris and Todaro (1970), sees the informal segment as the 
inferior sector, the option of last resort. Due to barriers to entry, minimum wages, unions or other 
sources of segmentation, formal jobs are rationed. Workers in the informal sector are crowded out of 
the formal sector involuntarily, their wage being less than that in the formal sector.4 For example, an 
increase in the statutory wage in the formal sector will reduce formal employment but lead to a lower 
informal wage and higher informal employment. During a recession informal employment and output 
expands because formal employment is reduced, while the informal labor market clears. In this view 
labor market segmentation between formality and informality is the defining feature of the labor market. 
In contrast, in a competitive labor market one would expect workers to be able to move freely 
between occupations, and for wages (broadly interpreted) to equalize accordingly. In this view the 
formal and informal sectors of the labor market are not segmented, but integrated. Voluntary choice 
regarding jobs and particular attributes of these jobs, such as flexible hours, working as a self-employed 
and being one’s own boss as a micro-entrepreneur, and not valuing social security benefits and/or future 
pension benefits, can be the reasons for remaining in or moving into informal employment (Maloney 
                                                            
4 In this school of thought, formal sector jobs not only command higher wages but also provide employment 
protection and fringe benefits that are both absent with informal sector jobs. 
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1999, 2004; Cunningham and Maloney 2001). Here, contrary to the segmentation case, formal and 
informal employment are not necessarily negatively correlated over the business cycle.  
Segmentation and integration of the formal and informal labor market segments are two polar 
views regarding the interaction of formality and informality. However, as suggested by Tokman (1986) 
and Fields (1990), it is possible that these features co-exist in the same labor market segment, given the 
heterogeneity of informal workers. Tokman and Fields envision two segments: an ‘easy-entry’ informal 
sector, which constitutes the involuntary segment, and an ‘upper-tier’ informal sector, where barriers of 
entry persist and in which participation is voluntary. Hence, the labor market is divided into a formal 
sector, a ‘disadvantaged’ subsistence-level informal sector and a voluntary informal sector, where we 
can find salaried workers but also micro-entrepreneurs.  
In recent years, this lay-out of the presented paradigms has been questioned as far too schematic 
and polar. For example, several contributions in Guha-Kasnobis, Kanbur and Ostrom (2006) take issue 
with a dichotomous view of labor markets in developing countries along the formal-informal divide.  
For example, Chen (ibidem) sees exclusively formal and informal firms and employment as polar cases 
and stresses that there exists a continuum between these poles where most workers and firms locate. 
Guha-Kasnobis, Kanbur and Ostrom in their introductory remarks highlight that the terms formal and 
informal are rather metaphors that have connotations that are context-dependent. A somewhat different 
line of critical reasoning is taken by some empirical labor economists who argue that once sound 
econometric techniques are employed evidence confirming labor market segmentation disappears or 
labor market segmentation becomes at best marginal. These authors essentially claim that informal-
formal wage gaps across the distribution are driven by selection: once researchers take account of 
unobservable characteristics of salaried workers or of the self-employed these gaps for the most part 
disappear or become tiny (see, e.g., Bargain and Kwenda, 2011, 2014). This last point is not confirmed 
in the Ukrainian case even as we employ the most up-to-date econometric model of fixed effects quantile 
regressions as we shall demonstrate in the results section. The presented paradigms strike us, therefore, 
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as still a useful point of departure in the understanding of the role of informal employment in the labor 
market. 
 
3. Defining and operationalizing informal employment and the empirical literature on testing 
labor market segmentation in post-transition economies 
3.1 Defining and operationalizing informal employment   
Before we present the literature that tests labor market segmentation in post-transition economies we 
need to briefly discuss how we define informality and informal employment in this study and which 
questions from the ULMS survey we use to establish voluntary and involuntary informal employment. 
The definition of informality is a very complex issue as nicely exposited, for example, in chapter 1 of 
Perry et al. (2007) and in Kanbur (2009). There are essentially two broad groups of definitions in the 
literature: the “productivity-based” and the “legalistic” or social protection definitions. The first one 
characterizes informality in the labor market by job characteristics: non-professional self-employed, 
unskilled workers, persons in marginal jobs, domestic and family workers and workers in small firms 
with up to 5 employees are all considered informal workers. The “legalistic” or social protection 
definition considers non-compliance with the regulations of the state regarding labor laws and social 
security systems as the defining characteristic of informality. Dependent workers who, in order to avoid 
paying taxes, do not pay social security and/or pension contributions or are prevented from doing so by 
their employers are considered informal. The self-employed who do not register their activities with the 
state are also considered informal.  
We use the “legalistic” definition throughout in this paper since we find that using a 
“productivity-based” concept when defining informal or formal sectors would be rather misleading, 
certainly in post-transition countries. For example, to take all non-professional self-employed or 
workers in micro firms as belonging to the informal sector might be appropriate in a developing country 
context but often introduces large measurement error in post-transition countries. Our early study on 
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informal employment in Ukraine (Lehmann and Pignatti 2007), for example, shows that in 2003 and 
2004 a large part of the non-professional self-employed are formal workers and that more than 60 
percent of informal salaried workers are employed in non-micro firms. Hence, using a productivity-
based concept of informality can lead to massive measurement error. Below, we will present the 
concrete questions answered by respondents that allow us to pin down informal employment using the 
legalistic definition. Having a precisely defined measure of informal employment is an important 
premise of rigorous testing of labor market segmentation since it avoids the “fuzziness” that according 
to Kanbur (2009, 2015) many studies are plagued by. 
Turning to the relevant questions in the ULMS survey allows us to operationalize informal 
employment relationships and their voluntary or involuntary nature. We use the information we have 
for the reference weeks in the main job5 and define an employment relationship as formal if employees 
answer the following question by choosing option 1, informal if they choose option 2: 
Tell me, please, are you officially registered at this job, that is, are you on a work roster, work 
agreement or contract? 
1. Registered  2. Not Registered. 
For the self-employed we use a similar question: 
Is your activity registered?  
 1. Yes  2. No 
The self-employed decide for themselves whether to register their activity or not. We, therefore, think 
of all informal self-employed as voluntary informal self-employed. For employees we elicit the 
additional information about the (in-) voluntary nature of their informal job by asking the following 
question:  
Why are you not officially registered at this job? 
1. Employer does not want to register me. 
2. I do not want to register. 
                                                            
5 According to the ULMS data only a small fraction of workers has a secondary job: in 2003, 2004 and 2007 2.23%, 2.4% 
and 1.65% respectively.  
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3. Both. 
 
Answer 1 classifies a person in her/his main job as involuntary informal employed, answers 2 
and/or 3 as voluntary informal employed. 
We now turn to the two main approaches in the empirical literature that test labor market 
segmentation. One method looks at the question whether there is a wage gap between similar workers 
who have formal and informal employment relationships. The second method looks at mobility between 
labor market states to assess whether there are barriers between formal and informal segments of the 
labor market or whether workers can move freely between these segments. We exclusively focus on 
empirical studies dealing with post-transition economies. 
3.2 The empirical literature on labor market segmentation in post-transition economies 
3.2.1 Wage gap analysis 
We start off with the evidence on the wage gap along the formal-informal divide, which is very limited 
for post- transition countries. Evidence, which is based on cross-sectional data, is severely biased 
because of selection problems: unobserved characteristics such as ability or motivation might be 
important determinants of an individual’s selection into a formal or informal job. Fixed effects estimates 
of wage differentials based on longitudinal data control for unobserved heterogeneity as long as the 
unobserved characteristics are time-invariant and equally remunerated across jobs. Even though the use 
of longitudinal data has its own problems when assessing wage gaps (Solon 1988), we report on two 
studies that employ panel data: Pagés and Stampini (2009) and Lehmann and Pignatti (2007), since they 
provide relatively reliable estimates of formal-informal wage gaps.  
Pagés and Stampini analyze wage differentials in three post-transition countries: Albania, 
Georgia and Ukraine. They use cross-sectional and fixed effects regressions and difference-in-
differences analysis to investigate whether there is a premium for formal jobs or for informal jobs in the 
three countries, distinguishing between skilled and unskilled workers. The cross-sectional results 
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establish a premium in informal jobs in Georgia for the unskilled and a formality premium in Ukraine 
across both skill levels. These results are overturned when longitudinal data are employed in the 
estimations. In Georgia the authors establish a wage gain for workers who change from formal to 
informal jobs, and this wage gain is larger for skilled workers than for their unskilled counterparts. In 
Ukraine, on the other hand, the formality premium disappears when unobserved characteristics are 
controlled for. According to the authors, in Ukraine the formal wage premium comes about because 
higher ability workers select themselves into formal jobs and not because jobs are of higher quality in 
the formal sector. In Georgia, they establish the astonishing results that higher ability workers seem to 
select themselves into informal jobs. Finally, the results for Albania show no premium independent of 
the estimation method used. So, the evidence of Pagés and Stampini seems to point to integrated labor 
markets in the three analyzed post-transition countries. 
The paper by Lehmann and Pignatti (2007), our early study on informal employment in Ukraine, 
uses the waves 2003 and 2004 of the ULMS to analyze informal-formal wage gaps. Like Pagés and 
Stampini, we estimate fixed effects and difference-in-differences regressions, dividing employment into 
five mutually exclusive states: formal salaried, voluntary informal salaried, involuntary informal 
salaried, formal self-employment and informal self-employment. The latter category includes informal 
entrepreneurs whose number in the sample is small, though. We use the same division of employment 
in this paper.  
Relative to the default category of formal salaried workers, the fixed effects regressions of our 
early research show positive wage differentials in Ukraine for voluntary informal salaried workers, 
formal self-employment and informal self-employment, while there is no significant difference in the 
wages of formal salaried and involuntary informal salaried workers. The difference-in-differences 
estimates of log hourly real earnings for movers versus stayers confirm the fixed effects regression 
results. There is no difference in the growth rates of hourly wages for formal salaried and involuntary 
informal salaried workers; however, for the other three employment categories hourly wages grow more 
than for formal salaried workers. This growth differential is particularly large for the informally self-
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employed. In this early research we did not estimate formal-informal wage gaps across the entire 
distribution, though.  
Summarizing the results of our early study and the research by Pagés and Stampini on the 
Ukrainian labor market, the evidence seems to suggest that once one controls for self-selection into an 
employment state the wage differential between the formal and informal sector disappears. The results 
also imply that the informal sector is in itself segmented since we find a positive wage premium for 
those who voluntarily choose informality, i.e., the voluntary informal salaried and the informal self-
employed. However, given that we have one more wave of data and given the advances in fixed effects 
quantile regression even with short panels, our new study provides more solid evidence regarding the 
question of labor market segmentation in Ukraine.  
The outcomes presented by Pagés and Stampini and Lehmann and Pignatti for Ukraine are 
roughly confirmed by more recent work on Russia by Lehmann and Zaiceva (2013) who employ OLS 
and fixed effects estimation of the informal-formal wage gap. The OLS estimates establish a wage 
penalty for informal employees and an insignificant wage differential for informal self-employed and 
entrepreneurs once sector and occupation are controlled for. The outcome for informal employees is, 
however, not an expression of differences in job qualities as the fixed effects estimates do not point to 
a significant wage differential; so, once the authors control for time-invariant unobserved characteristics 
such as innate ability and motivation, informal employees are remunerated similarly to formal 
employees. On the other hand, like in the Ukrainian labor market, the informal self-employed and 
entrepreneurs receive a wage premium even when self-selection is taken into account.  
Lehmann and Zaiceva (2013) provide additional information regarding labor market 
segmentation by estimating the hourly wage gap over the entire wage distribution, using pooled quantile 
regressions. Low skilled informal employees experience a statistically significant and economically 
meaningful wage penalty while informal employees with high skills have the same wages as their formal 
counterparts. Hence their quantile regression results tell us that for highly skilled informal employees, 
having a share of roughly 30% of informal salaried employment, the labor market is integrated; in 
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contrast, the majority of salaried informal workers, who have lower skills, experience a significant wage 
gap and seem thus confronted with a segmented labor market in Russia. When the self-employed and 
entrepreneurs are added to dependent employees the picture changes substantially. Now the informal 
sector seems segmented in the sense of Tokman (1986) and Fields (1990) since we have a lower part of 
the distribution with wage penalties (a free entry lower tier) and an upper part with positive wage 
differentials (a rationed upper tier).  
3.2.2 Mobility analysis 
How mobile are workers in labor markets of post-transition countries across the formal-informal divide? 
Researchers use transition probability matrices in various forms to approach this question. They look at 
simple P[i,j] matrices where i and j are the origin and destination states respectively and P is the 
estimated probability of movement between these two states, assuming a Markov process. Let i 
represent informal employment and j formal employment. When P[i,j]>>P[j,i], this seems to imply that 
there is a much higher likelihood of flowing from informal into formal employment than vice versa. 
Hence workers supposedly queue in the informal sector to enter formal employment, which is taken as 
evidence of labor market segmentation. This simple comparison of flows has been criticized insofar as 
it does not take into account the different turnover rates across labor market states. If most of the 
workforce is employed formally and the informal sector is comprised of only a small share of the 
workforce it is just a statistical artifact that the transition rate from informal to formal employment is a 
multiple of the transition rate from formal to informal employment. To account for this artifact 
researchers produce transition matrices that are adjusted for the relative size of a state and for its capacity 
to generate vacancies. The studies by Lehmann and Pignatti (2007) on Ukraine, by Pagés and Stampini 
(2009) on 3 Latin American and 3 post-transition countries6, by Bernabè and Stampini (2009) on 
Georgia and by Slonimczyk and Gimpelson (2015) on Russia explicitly discuss how simple transition 
matrices might have to be transformed to achieve comparability of the transition probabilities across 
                                                            
6 The three transition countries are Albania, Georgia and Ukraine. 
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states of different size. Slonimczyk and Gimpelson (2015) raise the additional issue that movements 
between labor market states are also determined by unobserved characteristics and that persons with 
different characteristics select themselves into different states. They postulate that once one takes 
account of the unobserved characteristics as drivers of self-selection into informal or formal 
employment the large difference in transition rates are attenuated or disappear.  
A detailed discussion of the mobility patterns estimated in these papers can be found in Lehmann 
(2015). This discussion on worker mobility across the formal-informal divide leaves us with the 
impression that the jury is still out with respect to definitive statements about labor market segmentation 
in post-transition countries. The studies on Ukraine by Lehmann and Pignatti (2007) and Pagés and 
Stampini (2009) at any rate use very short panels. Instead, in the present paper we have data that allow 
us to look at medium-term transitions that help us to better understand whether workers line up in the 
informal sector in order to eventually enter formal salaried employment.  
 
4. The ULMS data, descriptive evidence and our research strategy 
4.1 The ULMS data 
Our principal source of information is the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS), a 
nationally representative survey of the Ukrainian work force, undertaken for the first time in the spring 
of 2003, when it was comprised of around 4,000 households and approximately 8,500 individuals. The 
second wave was administered between May and July of 2004, when sample sizes fell to 3,397 and 
7,200 respectively. Data of the third wave were collected in 2007 with 3101 questionnaires of 
households and 6774 individual questionnaires filled out. The fourth wave in 2012 saw 3142 completed 
household interviews and 7122 completed individual interviews. In this paper we will only use the first 
three waves since we do not want to include the data point that is associated with the large shock of the 
Great Recession. A detailed description of the collected survey information and of the panel structure 
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of the ULMS can be found in Lehmann, Muravyev and Zimmermann (2012). We, therefore, only briefly 
discuss here the household and individual surveys of the ULMS. 
The household questionnaire contains items on the demographic structure of the household, its 
income and expenditure patterns together with living conditions. However, the core of the survey is the 
individual questionnaire, which besides generating the usual information contained in labor force 
surveys and information on preferences and political beliefs elicits detailed information concerning the 
labor market experience of Ukrainian workers. In the 2003 questionnaire, besides the reference week 
sections, there is an extensive retrospective part, which ascertains each individual’s labor market 
circumstances beginning at specific points in time, namely December 1986, December 1991 and 
December 1997. The first two points are chosen to minimize recall bias, since the first date is close to 
the Chernobyl incident and the second date marks the end of the Soviet Union.  The respective module 
is then structured in such a way that the data record the month and year of every labor market transition 
or change in circumstance between December 1997 and the date of interview. The surveys for 2004 and 
2007 have a similar retrospective part covering the intervals 2003 to 2004 and 2004 to 2007. Since we 
have complete labor market histories of all those in the panel, we are able to address the issue of “round-
tripping” when estimating transition probabilities between labor market states.  
Since a main focus of our study is wage gap analysis it is important to provide a precise and 
comparable measure of earnings across the various categories of employment.7 For dependent workers 
we use the answer to the question about the actual net monthly wage paid (“net of taxes and without 
bonuses”) and arrive at net hourly earnings by dividing the monthly sum by actual hours worked. 
Clearly, for dependent employees hourly wages are comparable for formally and informally employed 
workers. Self-employed workers are asked to give an estimate of their net monthly income, resulting in 
comparable measures of hourly earnings for formal self-employed and their informal counterparts once 
                                                            
7 In this study we disaggregate the employment state into formal salaried employment, informal voluntary and informal 
involuntary salaried employment, formal self-employment and informal self-employment. 
14 
 
we normalize by monthly actual hours worked. All hourly earnings are real, i.e., they are given in 2003 
consumer prices.  
4.2.Descriptive evidence 
Before we discuss average wages and their distribution across the five employment states, we highlight 
interesting patterns that can be observed in tables 1 and A.1. In post-transition economies men are found 
to be more engaged in informal employment than women, in contrast to developing countries where 
females are more present in informality. From Table 1 we can infer that this higher incidence of informal 
employment by males is entirely due to informal self-employment, at least in Ukraine. Whilst ethnicity 
does not play a major role in the selection into any employment state, formally salaried workers and the 
formal self-employed are older than workers of the other categories and also have a higher incidence of 
marriage. Workers with basic elementary or less education are underrepresented in formal employment, 
where we find a high share of workers with higher education. It is also striking that more than three 
quarters of informally employed workers have vocational or secondary education; informal employment 
in Ukraine is hence not necessarily connected to low educational attainment and low skill levels as 
mooted by La Porta and Shleifer (2008) for most developing countries.  
The average household size is not really different across the five employment categories. What is, 
however, particularly interesting is that formal salaried workers have a larger average number of other 
family members working in the formal sector than all types of informal workers. This fact does not 
seem to support the hypothesis put forth by many students of informality that workers whose other 
family members work in the formal sector and who are hence entitled to family-based health benefits 
have a predilection for informal employment. At least in Ukraine, we see households where the 
probability that a worker is formally employed is positively correlated with the spouse’s formal 
employment. It is worth stressing that the thus far highlighted patterns do not differ across gender.  
However, once we look at the sectoral distribution of the five employment states we find gender 
differences. When we look at the entire sample, formal salaried workers are predominantly employed 
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in industry, education, health and social protection and public administration, informal employees 
whilst having an important share in industry are concentrated in agriculture, construction, and trade, 
hotels and restaurants; we find roughly two thirds of formal self-employed workers in this latter sector. 
When we splice the data by gender, we see that nearly 40% of formal male employees work in industry, 
while female formal employees reach a similar percentage in education, health and social protection. 
Table A1, which shows the distribution by sector across gender in more detail, also demonstrates large 
gender differences with respect to self-employment. Among informal self-employed females more than 
half work in agriculture while this share among their male counterparts is less than one third. One the 
other hand, more than a third of male self-employed informal workers is engaged in construction, while 
the percentage for females in this sector is unsurprisingly very small. When it comes to informal self-
employed in trade, hotels and restaurants we find substantial and not too different percentages for both 
sexes. When we look at formal self-employment, females have a whopping 81% share in this sector 
whilst for males this share amounts to slightly more than one half. Large gender differences in the 
employment shares are also given regarding both voluntary and involuntary dependent informal 
employees. Male workers in these employment categories have large shares in construction, whilst 
shares for their female counterparts are miniscule. On the other hand, nearly two thirds of female 
dependent informal employees work in trade, hotels and restaurants irrespective of whether they are 
there of their free will or not. In contrast, male workers in these employment categories have a much 
smaller share. 
Turning to the distributions by firm size shown in table 1 we find that in the new century formal 
employees work in their majority still in large firms. What is also striking is the large share of informal 
employees in relatively large firms. Since it is unlikely that firms of this size are in the informal sector, 
we deal here with many informal employment relationships within the formal sector. Unsurprisingly, 
self-employed workers, whether formal or informal, work predominantly in micro firms.8 Finally, from 
                                                            
8 It is certainly surprising that 2% of the self-employed report to work in environments where there are more than one 
thousand employees. However, the results shown are responses to the following question: “What is the total number of 
people working at this enterprise/organization/workplace for self-employed?” and do not represent the 
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the distribution of shares across macro-regions it is difficult to answer the question whether informal 
employment is a regional issue in Ukraine.  
Table 2 provides multinomial logit estimates of employment states in the form of odds ratios for the 
entire sample. These estimates confirm the previous interpretation of our descriptive statistics or give 
us a clearer view where descriptive statistics are not revealing. There is confirmation that women are 
strongly underrepresented in informal self-employment, that voluntary informal salaried workers are 
younger and that older workers are particularly engaged in formal self-employment. We also find 
confirmed that formal employees live in households with other formal salaried workers and that workers 
with higher educational education work disproportionately as formal salaried employees or formal self-
employed. 
Regarding the sectoral structure of employment types we establish strong evidence that informal 
self-employment is concentrated in agriculture and that voluntary and involuntary informal employees 
as well as the formal self-employed work predominantly in construction, as well as trade, hotels and 
restaurants. In contrast, formal employees dominate in industry, education, health and social protection 
as well as public administration. We also see that informal employment relationships are predominantly 
in small firms and that this is especially the case when it comes to any form of self-employment. The 
regional patterns of employment types do not become much clearer with the MNL estimates. In an 
online appendix we also present MNL estimates separately for women and men.9 These estimates do 
not diverge much from those for the entire sample. It is worth stressing, though, that the large and highly 
significant odds ratios for voluntary and informal employees in construction are entirely driven by men 
and that self-employed informal male workers are of great importance in construction while all the odds 
ratios for women in this sector are insignificant. In contrast, both female and male involuntary informal 
employees and formal self-employed are disproportionately represented in trade, hotels and restaurants.  
                                                            
number of workers hired by the self-employed. Those self-employed who hire workers have two employees on 
average.  
9 The online appendix can be found on the IZA website at the link: http://ftp.iza.org/dp11256_app.pdf. 
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Table A1 tells us that about half of all informal self-employed females work in agriculture, while 
about a third of males of this employment state work in the sector. Since we consider these workers 
subsistence farmers we exclude them from the further analysis for reasons we discuss in the research 
strategy section.   
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the distributions of real hourly earnings of all workers over the 
panel period, while Figures 2-4 present the earnings distributions for the five employment categories in 
2003, 2004 and 2007. We see a substantial rightward shift of the earnings distributions between 2003 
and 2007 in Figure 1, an indication of strong real wage growth in the analyzed period. The first row in 
table 1 reports the mean real hourly earnings in Hryvnia averaged over the three years for the entire 
sample and by gender. Self-employed workers, whether formal or informal, have far higher mean 
earnings than salaried employees. Among the latter types of workers involuntary informal workers have 
the lowest average earnings whilst their voluntary counterparts have slightly higher average earnings 
than formal employees. We also see a gender wage gap across all employment categories. The large 
standard deviations relative to the estimated mean earnings point to the tremendous heterogeneity of 
individual earnings within employment categories, where this heterogeneity is particularly pronounced 
among the formal and informal self-employed.  
The distributions of real earnings across the five employment types, shown in Figures 2-4 for the 
entire sample, confirm this heterogeneity and provide us with additional interesting information. Since 
the earnings distributions of the five employment categories have similar relative profiles across the 
three years we restrict the discussion to the profiles for 2003. As reflected in the standard deviations 
given in Table 1, formal and informal salaried workers are confronted with substantially more 
compressed earnings distributions than the formal and informal self-employed. What is striking is that 
the distribution of the formal self-employed has a lot of mass to the right of the distribution of formal 
salaried workers but hardly any mass to the left and lower part of the formal salaried distribution. So, 
there are many formal self-employed who earn high wages. In contrast, as far as the informal self-
employed are concerned, there is some small mass to the right and upper part of the distribution of 
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formal salaried workers, and a lot of mass to the left and lower part of the formal salaried distribution. 
Hence there are many informal self-employed who earn very low wages and only a few with high 
earnings. Among salaried workers, those who are involuntarily informal are confronted with the lowest 
wages throughout as inspection of Figure 2 demonstrates: there is a very large chunk of the distribution 
to the left of the formal salaried distribution and at higher wages the distribution is to the left of the 
formal salaried distribution throughout. So, on this evidence involuntarily informal salaried workers 
seem to do worse than formal salaried workers and all the other employment groups. The voluntarily 
informal salaried workers, on the other hand, are confronted with a somewhat wider distribution than 
the formal salaried, with quite a few workers earning higher wages and only a few that have worse 
earnings.  
The earnings distributions presented separately for women and men in the online appendix point to 
some interesting gender differences. Women and men have similar real wage growth between 2003 and 
2007 as figures B1 and B2 attest. The larger average earnings for men shown in table 1 are also 
confirmed for overall earnings in all three years. Turning to the earnings distributions across the five 
employment types allows us to refine the analysis of the relative wage positions across employment 
status that we discussed in the previous paragraph. We again focus on the year 2003 since the relative 
earnings profiles are similar across years for each gender as inspection of figures B3 – B8 reveals.  
Male formal salaried workers have a wider earnings distribution than females in this employment 
group. The male distribution is also located more to the right than the one for females. Inspection of 
figures B3 and B4 also allows us to infer that there are a lot more formal salaried women who earn very 
low wages than men while we observe the opposite in the high wage segment. The gender differences 
for the formally self-employed are also striking. In the very low part of the earnings distribution we find 
more female formal self-employed than dependent formal employees, implying that a relative large 
share of female formal self-employed earn very low wages. In contrast, hardly any of the male formal 
self-employed earns truly low wages. When we compare the upper tails for this employment group 
across gender we also can infer that it is particularly men who in great numbers earn high wages, while 
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there are less female formal self-employed who earn such wages. These relative gender differences with 
the formal self-employed might be related to the higher share of males in other services, which include 
transportation, financial and real estate services, while females are predominantly in trade, hotels and 
restaurants where average earnings are lower.10 
When it comes to informal self-employment we see relatively similar patterns across gender: relative 
to formal salaried workers there are a lot of informal self-employed with very low earnings, and only 
few with high earnings. However, we do see a fatter tail in the upper part of the male distribution, which 
might explain the relatively high average earnings. Males who are involuntary informal dependent 
employees seem to be especially penalized with respect to earnings as there are many such workers in 
the lower earnings segment and hardly any in the upper segment. For women of this employment type 
penalties seem more attenuated across the distribution. The situation is reversed as far as voluntary 
dependent informal employment is concerned as women seem more penalized than men relative to 
formal salaried workers.  
The presented descriptive evidence on the earnings distributions leads us to conclude that it is crucial 
to undertake the analysis of the formal-informal earnings gap across the whole distribution and to divide 
the data by gender. Only in this way will we produce the refined picture of the labor market in Ukraine 
that is necessary to properly discuss labor market segmentation. 
4.3. Our research strategy 
To test for labor market segmentation we pursue two approaches, the analysis of worker mobility across 
labor market states and wage gap regressions at the mean and across the entire earnings distribution. 
Regarding the analysis of worker mobility we use a panel across a longer interval than done thus far in 
                                                            
10 Average hourly earnings of the formal self-employed in trade, hotels and restaurants are 4.59 Hryvnia, while they are 5.22 
Hryvnia in other services.  
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the literature on post-transition countries. We also take advantage of recent advances in fixed effects 
quantile regression that allow us to produce consistent estimates even with a relatively short panel. 
 Regarding our transition estimates, our analytical approach follows Clark and Summers (1979) 
and Bellmann, Estrin, Lehmann and Wadsworth (1995) in assuming that transitions between labor 
market states are governed by a Markov process. This implies that the transition is only a function of 
the previous state. Having the states of formal salaried employment (FS), voluntary informal salaried 
employment (VI), involuntary informal salaried employment (INVI), formal self-employment (SEF), 
informal self-employment (SEI), unemployment (U) and inactivity (OLF), we have 49 potential 
transitions, where the gross probability of transition from state i to state j can be written as: 
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where ijF  is the number of persons flowing from state i in period t-1 to state j in period t and iS is the 
number of persons in the origin stock in period t - 1. Finally, under Markovian assumptions duration of 
state occupancy is exponentially distributed and given by the reciprocal of the outflow rate: 
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In our analysis we rely on two intervals of transitions, 2003 to 2004 and 2003 to 2007. 
Comparing the transitions of the short-term matrix with the transitions of the medium-term matrix we 
attempt to answer the following questions: what are the preferred employment states of Ukrainian 
workers, that is in which states do we find particularly long average durations of state occupancy? Are 
Ukrainian workers lining up in informal employment to eventually enter formal salaried employment? 
Do the informal self-employed show different transition patterns from informal salaried workers? To 
see whether there is heterogeneity in transitions across gender and age, we estimate short- and medium-
term transition probability matrices for the entire sample, for women and men, and for three age groups. 
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Our focus on the transitions and the relative durations of state occupancy in the medium-term 
for the seven labor market states allows us to get credible answers to these questions without 
transforming the Pi,j matrices in any way. We also do not need to construct counterfactual matrices that 
capture no segmentation and compare these to the actual transition probability matrices as is done, for 
example, in Pages and Stampini (2009). The construction of these counterfactual matrices requires 
several assumptions that cannot really be verified with the two-year panel that the authors have at their 
disposal. 
 Estimated transition probabilities might be affected by the problem of “round-tripping”, i.e., 
when persons appear in the same state at time t and t-1 but have changed their status between the two 
points in time. “Round-tripping” might be a particularly serious problem for medium-term transitions. 
In what follows we, therefore, present transition probability estimates with and without “round-
trippers.” Since we have a complete labor market history of each individual in the panel we can establish 
whether this person changed state between times t and t-1. We should point out, though, that the relative 
magnitudes are similar whether we have excluded “round-trippers” or not. A second issue that might 
bias our transition estimates is selection due to attrition. Simple probit regressions demonstrate that 
workers in informal employment relationships are slightly more likely to attrite than workers who are 
formal.11 We do not believe, however, that the very strong results obtained are due to attrition.12 
 We assume that the informal self-employed in agriculture are subsistence farmers. It is highly 
unlikely that these farmers will ever change their employment status. Retaining these individuals in the 
sample would, therefore, bias our results in that we would have a longer average duration of state 
occupancy than when we eliminate these individuals from the analysis. In other words, the employment 
status informal self-employment would appear more desirable than it actually is for those who can 
                                                            
11 These probit regressions are available upon request. 
12 In the wage gap analysis we provide a robustness check where we explicitly control for potential selection bias due to 
attrition. 
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and/or are willing to move between states.13 Therefore, it strikes us as sensible to eliminate the informal 
self-employed in agriculture from the analysis. 
 Our second approach of testing the nature of the Ukrainian labor market relies on wage gap 
analysis estimating various types of Mincer equations. To estimate formal-informal wage gaps at the 
mean, we use pooled OLS regressions, pooled Heckit regressions to account for self-selection into 
employment as well as fixed effects regressions taking advantage of the three waves of the ULMS. In 
all our earnings regressions we control for gender, ethnicity, age, educational attainment, tenure, firm 
size and part-time work as well as for back pay, wage arrears, occupation, sector and ownership of the 
firm. We also add dummies for the three informal types of employment and for formal self-employment; 
so, we estimate wage gaps relative to formal salaried workers. The exclusion restrictions for the Heckit 
models are household size, number of dependent children, number of other formal salaried members in 
the household as these variables predict participation but not earnings. The fixed effects regressions 
control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. 
 To test for selection due to attrition and incidental truncation in fixed effects regressions we 
follow Wooldridge (2002). As far as attrition is concerned we add a lead selection indicator term si,t+1, 
which always takes the value 0 if the individual i remains in the sample throughout the panel, and the 
value 1 just prior to dropping out of the sample. Since we have T>2 with our ULMS panel we can 
perform this test of the effect of attrition on the response variable earnings. To test for the impact of 
selection due to incidental truncation we follow Wooldridge (1995) and estimate a general participation 
equation in the presence of unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, with the resulting lambda () 
added into the fixed effects earnings regressions. We perform our selection tests by including si,t+1 and 
 separately and jointly into the regressions. 
                                                            
13 In actual fact, when we include the informal self-employed in agriculture the diagonal element for informal self-
employment in the 2003 – 2007 transition probability matrix is 0.44, whilst it is only 0.18 when we exclude these individuals. 
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 The second leg of our wage gap analysis consists in pooled quantile and fixed effects quantile 
regressions. Clearly, estimating the wage gap for different types of informal employment and self-
employment across the entire distribution is more illuminating than just estimates at the mean. For 
example, informal self-employed workers might incur a wage penalty in the lower part of the 
distribution and a wage premium at high deciles, pointing to segmentation within the self-employment 
part of the informal sector (Tokman 1986 and Fields 1990). Selection problems are also relevant with 
quantile regression, of course. Until recently, having a short panel made it nearly impossible to properly 
correct for selection biases using a fixed effects model. However, the quantile regression estimator for 
panel data (QRPD) with non-additive fixed effects developed by Powell (2016) is consistent even if T 
is small. Hence, having a very short panel with T=3 is no longer an impediment when estimating 
informal-formal earnings gaps across the entire distribution consistently, i.e., when correcting for time-
invariant heterogeneity throughout the distribution. 14 
Main results 
5.1 Mobility analysis 
Tables 3 and 4 show annual transition probabilities and transition probabilities spanning four years 
respectively, with panels A presenting the probabilities when “round-trippers” are included, while 
panels B show the results without “round-trippers”. The exclusion of “round-trippers” produces a loss 
of 200 observations with the short-term transitions matrix, while we lose 662 observations in the case 
of the medium-term transitions matrix. However, inspection of the entries in panels A and B does not 
demonstrate major differences as far as the relative magnitudes of transition probabilities are concerned. 
Since the cleaner versions of transition probabilities are given without “round-trippers”, we concentrate 
on panels B of Tables 3 and 4 in our discussion. 
                                                            
14 Concretely, we employ the Stata package “qregpd” when estimating wage gaps for the three types of informal employment 
and for the formal self-employed.   
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 The entries denoted Pi. represent the share of the given group at the beginning of the period, the 
entries denoted P.j at the end of the period. In the 2003-2004 matrix we can see a slight rise of the share 
of formal salaried workers from 48% to 49%, while this rise is with 6 percentage points more 
pronounced between 2003 and 2007. Hence we see a strong growth of formal salaried employment in 
our sample. It is also striking that all types of informal employment increase their shares between 2003 
and 2007, whilst both unemployment and inactivity see falling shares. This fall is partially absorbed by 
the increase in formal salaried employment, and partially by a strong rise in all types of informal 
employment. Formal self-employment sees a doubling of its share in the medium-term, pointing to 
increased opportunities for the formally self-employed as the growth of the Ukrainian economy became 
more robust in the first decade of the new century.  
 The diagonal entries in the matrices are particularly revealing with respect to the desirability or 
stability of a state. In states where the Pij (i=j) entries are large state occupancy is long, i.e., workers 
entering such states prefer to remain in them, whilst states with Pij (i=j) relatively small exhibit a short 
state occupancy, i.e., workers entering such states prefer to leave them or are forced to leave them. In 
the period 2003 to 2004, stable states are on this measure any type of formal employment, and inactivity. 
On the other hand, any form of informal employment as well as unemployment are volatile or 
undesirable states. When we look at the medium-term matrix of Table 4, this dichotomous nature of 
labor market states is even more apparent. While the stable states still exhibit very large shares of 
stayers, the volatile states have tiny shares or a zero share of stayers. Of course, it is well known that 
unemployment state occupancy cannot be large over a four year period of growth. What is interesting 
for us here is, however, the fact that on our measure informal salaried employment, whether voluntary 
or involuntary, is essentially an undesired state. Informal self-employment, on the other hand, seems to 
some minor degree a desirable state since roughly one fifth of those in this state in 2003 still find 
themselves in it in 2007. Overall, though, the diagonal entries carry the clear message that formal 
dependent employment and formal self-employment are the two stable and desirable states in the 
Ukrainian labor market.   
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 The transition probabilities from the seven origin states to the seven destination states can shed 
additional light on the desirability of employment states. Even a cursory inspection of panels B in Tables 
3 and 4 makes it clear that the flows in the short interval are similar in their structure to the flows of the 
medium-term period. Since the flows in the latter period are particularly pronounced, we focus here on 
the medium-term transition probabilities.  
 Most workers who were formal dependent employees retain their status; there are some flows 
into informal salaried employment and into formal and informal self-employment. However, the largest 
shares of flows out of formal dependent employment have the destination states unemployment and 
inactivity. The relative size of these transitions is not very surprising, but it does make the point that 
transitions from formal into informal dependent employment are very marginal. Looking at the 
voluntary informal salaried employed, we find that nearly half of the workers being in this state in 2003 
have secured a job as a formal salaried worker. Roughly a quarter find themselves involuntarily in an 
informal job, and 13% have become formal self-employed. So, more than 60% of voluntary informal 
salaried workers have successfully queued in their origin state in order to enter formal employment. 
Those workers who in 2003 were involuntarily in informal salaried employment have also accessed a 
formal salaried job in large numbers in 2007. The second most important destination for this group of 
workers is informal self-employment. It seems plausible from the shown transition probabilities that 
formal salaried workers leave their state predominantly choosing unemployment or inactivity, while in 
their majority informal salaried workers use their states as a waiting stage to enter formal salaried 
employment if at all possible. Those who are not successful in doing this end up mostly as involuntary 
informal salaried workers (in the case of the originally voluntary informal employees) or in informal 
self-employment (in the case of the originally involuntary informal employees). 
The transition flows of the self-employed are rather different. In the case of formal self-
employment only a minority of workers moves out of the state; those who move out have formal salaried 
employment as their main destination state. As far as informal self-employment is concerned, more than 
a third of workers originally in this state become formal employees, while 12% switch from informal 
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to formal self-employment. From these flows we can draw the inference that is desirable to distinguish 
between dependent and self-employed informal workers: a substantial fraction of the informal self-
employed prefer to remain in their state, while informal dependent employees exit their state when they 
can. It is also worthy to stress that by far the most desirable destination state for movers is formal 
salaried employment.  
 We also briefly comment on the flows of one of the two other labor market states, 
unemployment. The two largest destination states are formal salaried employment and inactivity: more 
than two thirds of unemployed workers find a formal job or become discouraged and leave the labor 
market. We also see relative large shares for the destination states involuntary informal dependent 
employment and informal self-employment.  
 Tables A2 – A5 in the appendix and Tables B3 – B8 in the online appendix present transition 
probability matrices for the same short-term and medium-term periods with the sample split by gender 
and into three age groups respectively. The transition flows of women and men are very similar and in 
line with the flows of the entire sample. Only as far as informal self-employment and involuntary 
dependent informal employment are concerned do we observe some differences between the sexes. 
Women tend to remain in informal self-employment at more than double the rate of men and enter 
formal salaried at roughly half the rate as men do. On the other hand, men leave informal self-
employment in larger numbers than involuntary dependent informal employment. Hence, at least as far 
as men are concerned all types of informal employment seem equally undesirable. 
 Turning to the medium-term transitions by age group (tables B6 – B8) we see that for all groups 
formal dependent employment and formal self-employment are the stable and desirables states and by 
far the largest destination for workers coming from informal employment is formal salaried 
employment. There are, however, some differences across the three age groups. Young workers (age 
15 – 29) have a relative low share of stayers in formal self-employment and no one remains in informal 
self-employment after the 4 years. A comparison of table 4 with tables B7 and B8 demonstrates that 
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workers in the core group (age 30 – 44) and older workers (age 45 – 59) have very similar flows patterns 
to those of the overall sample.   
 Table A6 in the appendix demonstrates that roughly half of employment status switchers status 
also change sector and that this fraction does not differ significantly by gender. However, we can also 
see that for workers whose origin state was formal salaried employment this fraction is higher while for 
workers with origin state voluntary informal dependent employment this fraction is substantially smaller 
than 50%. In addition, female workers with origin state informal self-employment have a ratio that is 
with 33% particularly low. We perform a robustness check in the wage analysis below by including a 
dummy for those workers who both changed employment status and sector since Lehmann, Pignatti and 
Wadsworth (2006) find wage penalties for re-employed displaced workers who switched sector in the 
Ukrainian labor market.  
5.2 Wage gap regressions 
5.2.1 Wage gap regressions at the mean 
Table 5 presents the results of three models: pooled OLS, pooled Heckit and a fixed effects (FE) 
regression model. The first 3 columns give the results for the whole sample, while columns 4 to 6 
contain the estimates for women and columns 7 to 9 for men. Estimates of the selection equations for 
the entire sample and by gender can be found in table B9 in the online appendix. Average household 
size, number of other family members in the formal sector and number of dependent children are the 
exclusion restrictions underlying the pooled Heckit regressions: they are significant in the selection 
equations but have no predictive power in the wage regressions. Unsurprisingly, average household size 
lowers female participation, and the number of dependent children reduces participation by women but 
increases it for men. It is also striking that a larger number of other household members working in the 
formal sector increases labor force participation of both sexes.  
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 The results of table 5 show reasonable parameter estimates on the demographic variables that 
are very similar for the pooled OLS and the Heckit specifications.15 For example, women incur a wage 
penalty of about 22%, Ukrainian workers a small penalty of around 4%, which is in line with the work 
of Constant, Kahanec and Zimmermann (2012). In our results, this penalty is concentrated on female 
workers. Workers with higher educational attainment, on the other hand, have a large premium ranging 
between a whopping 39% to a modest 13% in the male FE specification.  
 The parameter estimates that mainly interest us are related to the dummies for the three types of 
informal employment and for formal self-employment. They reflect a mean wage premium or wage 
penalty relative to formal salaried workers. Before we discuss the various parameter estimates we need 
to touch upon potential biases introduced in the FE regression because the effects are identified by those 
who move in and out of a state. Descriptive statistics on the characteristics of “stayers” and “movers” 
related to an employment state do not show significant differences.16 Furthermore the differences in the 
estimates on the employment dummies are not statistically significant as inspection of Table 5 makes 
clear. This leads us to believe that the FE estimates are not driven by the peculiar nature of “movers” 
and that the estimates control for unobserved heterogeneity regarding the full samples and not the 
samples of movers. 
At the mean, voluntary informal employees receive a wage premium of between about 16% in 
the Heckit specification to 22% in the FE specification when we look at the whole sample. When we 
split the sample by gender we get similar coefficients in the OLS and Heckit specifications, while the 
wage premia in the fixed effects case are no longer significant. Especially interesting is the category of 
involuntary informal salaried workers, who make up the majority of informal employees. Looking at 
the whole sample, they incur a wage penalty of roughly 7% in the pooled OLS and Heckit specifications. 
                                                            
15 Heckman’s lambda is never significant in our estimations, implying that selection into employment does not affect the 
results. This can also be seen by the fact that the parameter estimates of the pooled OLS and of the Heckit models are very 
close. 
16 These descriptive statistics are not shown here, but available upon request. We should add the caveat here that a comparison 
of “stayers” and “movers” is not operational for the two states of dependent informal employment since we have seen in the 
mobility analysis that in the end all workers originating from these two states have eventually left these states. 
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This wage penalty disappears when we control for time-invariant unobserved characteristics in the FE 
regression. Hence, those involuntarily employed in informal jobs seem to have worse unobserved 
characteristics than formal salaried workers. Formal self-employed workers receive large wage premia 
between 34% and 67% whether we look at the entire sample or women and men separately. These 
premia are not eliminated once we control for unobserved time-invariant characteristics. The joint 
sample of female and male informal self-employed also have wage premia that are large and that do not 
disappear when we control for time-invariant unobserved characteristics. So, selection problems seem 
to play a minor role in the Ukrainian labor market in contrast to the evidence on other developing 
countries presented, e.g., in Bargain and Kwenda (2011, 2014): essentially wage premia for the formal 
and informal self-employed at the mean do not disappear once we control for time-invariant unobserved 
characteristics of the workers involved. 
Our first robustness check consists in re-estimating the 3 models with the informal self-
employed in agriculture included (see table B10 in the online appendix). A comparison of tables 5 and 
B10 shows no substantive differences in the estimated coefficients on the employment status dummies. 
A second robustness check concerns the selection problem due to attrition and incidental truncation 
when we estimate the FE model. Following Wooldridge (2002) we have added an attrition term or a 
Heckman selection term or both to our FE regressions. The results of these regressions are presented in 
table B11 of the online appendix. We should make two observations with respect to this table. First, 
comparing Table 5 and Table B11, the coefficients on all the variables in all specifications of the FE 
model do not substantially change when we test for selection bias due to attrition or incidental 
truncation. Second, neither the coefficient on the attrition term nor on lambda is statistically significant 
whether we introduce the attrition dummy and lambda separately or jointly. Consequently, selection 
bias due to attrition or incidental truncation seems to be a very minor problem if any in our FE 
regressions. In the pooled OLS and Heckit regressions we also add a dummy for those who switched 
employment status and sector. The coefficients on this dummy are close to zero and never statistically 
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significant, hence switching both employment status and sector does not entail a wage penalty with our 
samples.17  
The upshot of our results regarding wage gaps at the mean is that voluntary informal salaried 
workers, the formal and informal self-employed receive wage premia that do not disappear once we 
control for unobserved time-invariant workers’ characteristics. In contrast, workers who are 
involuntarily informal employees experience a wage penalty that disappears once we control for 
unobserved heterogeneity, implying that workers with unobserved unfavorable characteristics find 
themselves in this state. These two conclusions are above all valid when we inspect the results for the 
entire sample, while the results for women and men separately are less strong due to reduced sample 
size. It is, therefore, important to buttress these conclusions with wage gap analysis across the entire 
earnings distribution.  
5.2.2 Quantile wage gap regressions  
We present the coefficients of the four employment states at the quantiles for pooled quantile wage 
regressions in Table 6 and for fixed effects quantile wage regressions in table 7, where we control for 
unobserved time-invariant characteristics of respondents. The coefficients estimates should be 
understood as returns relative to the returns of formal salaried workers at the respective quantile. These 
estimates are presented for the entire sample (upper panel), for women (middle panel) and for men 
(bottom panel). The regressions on which tables 6 and 7 are based are shown in extended form in tables 
B12 – B17 in the online appendix.  
We first discuss the estimates on all the variables apart from the employment types in Table B12, i.e., 
when we do not control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. We then confront these estimates 
with those coming out of the fixed effects quantile regressions in B15.18 Finally, we turn to our main 
                                                            
17 The results of this last robustness check are not shown here, but available upon request. 
18 The results for women and men in tables 13 – 14 and 16 – 17 are grosso modo similar to the results gotten with the entire 
sample. To save space we do not discuss these tables here and leave it to the reader to explore these tables. 
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focus, the returns of four employment types relative to the returns of formal employees, comparing the 
results of the pooled and of the fixed effects quantile regressions in tables 6 and 7. 
In Table B12, the gender wage gap is quite pronounced and increasing with higher hourly earnings; 
also, workers of Ukrainian ethnicity have a small wage penalty throughout the distribution. One 
additional year of tenure gives a slightly higher return at all percentiles, while age, on the other hand, 
plays a role only at the 3rd decile and in the upper part of the distribution, producing a small premium 
for older workers. As far as educational attainment is concerned it is only higher education that gives 
higher and increasing returns relative to basic elementary and less education as we sweep through the 
distribution. Part-time workers experience a small wage penalty in the bottom decile but large and 
monotonically increasing premia from the fourth decile onwards. From the second decile to the median, 
married workers get a slightly higher wage than workers who have another civil status. When we control 
for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in Table B15, we see similar effects across the distribution 
as in Table B12 for higher education, tenure, part-time and married workers. Age, on the other hand, 
has a positive impact only at the seventh decile, but negative profiles nearly everywhere else in the 
distribution. Also, vocational and secondary education now generate positive returns between the 
second decile and the median, negative and positive returns at the eight and the ninth deciles 
respectively.  
The estimated coefficients on the employment type dummies presented in tables 6 and 7 are, of 
course, the main focus of our analysis here. We report sequentially on each employment state, for the 
entire sample, by gender, and without and with fixed effects. Voluntary informal employees have a 
wage premium only in the upper part of the distribution as long as we do not control for time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity. Splitting the data by gender, we see that this premium falls predominantly 
on women. When we introduce fixed effects, relative returns increase nearly throughout the distribution. 
One needs to carefully interpret this finding. Since we compare the earnings of workers in the informal 
state to the earnings of formal salaried workers an increase in relative returns once we control for time-
invariant unobservable characteristics can be explained by negative selection of the informally 
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employed and/or positive selection of the formal employees. In other words, the voluntary informal 
employees have unobservable characteristics that lower their earnings in their informal jobs while the 
formal employees have unobservable features that are particularly beneficial in their held jobs. In the 
fixed effects regression this negative effect related to the informal employees and/or this positive effect 
related to formal employees are eliminated and the relative returns increase. We cannot disentangle 
these two effects and also cannot establish whether only one effect or both effects are in play and when 
both effects are present which effect prevails. But, as long as the earnings gap becomes larger as we go 
from pooled regression to fixed effects regression we can speak of negative selection of the voluntary 
informal employees.   
Involuntary informal employees are confronted with wage penalties, above all in the lower part of 
the distribution when we do not control for unobserved characteristics. These wage penalties are quite 
similar across gender. When we include fixed effects these penalties disappear in some deciles, implying 
that negative selection for involuntary informal employees is an issue in the Ukrainian labor market. 
However, since wage gaps are not everywhere eliminated with the introduction of fixed effects at most 
deciles, segmentation is prevalent for the majority of involuntary informal employees.  
The formal self-employed do especially well relative to formal employees as they have wage premia 
throughout the distribution that are monotonically rising to a whopping 83 percent in the highest decile. 
When we do not control for unobserved characteristics, self-employed women have particularly high 
relative returns. For both women and men we see an increase in relative returns once fixed effects are 
included.  Also in this case, the results point to some degree of negative selection: the self-employed 
seem to have time-invariant unobserved characteristics that lower their earnings in self-employment or 
their formal salaried counterparts have some unobservable characteristics that make them particularly 
suitable for formal salaried employment. At any rate, introducing fixed effects raises relative earnings 
for the formal self-employed.  
33 
 
The informal self-employed also do exceptionally well but only from the second decile onward, 
with a return in the highest decile that is 68 percent higher than formal employees. The relative returns 
that are significant above all in the upper part of the distribution are particularly large for women. Once 
fixed effects are added we see wage premia throughout the distribution for the entire sample and for 
women, while men get wage premia from the second decile onwards. It is striking that men throughout 
the distribution and women in its lower part get increasing relative returns once we account for 
unobserved characteristics, again pointing to some degree of negative selection. However, in the upper 
part of the distribution female informal self-employed experience a reduction in their relative returns. 
So, there is some positive selection in the case of these women; they have time-invariant unobserved 
characteristics that make them especially suitable for informal self-emplyoment, hence pushing down 
the wage premia estimates in the fixed effects quantile regressions.  
The main point of our quantile regression results, however, is that while involuntary informal 
employees are confronted with wage penalties, workers in the other employment categories experience 
large wage premia either throughout the distribution (the formal and informal self-employed) or through 
large parts of the distribution (the voluntary informal employees). For the most part, these penalties or 
premia, while often altered in size, are not eliminated once we control for time-invariant unobserved 
characteristics. 
6. Discussion and conclusions  
By combining the accumulated evidence regarding transitions between labor market states and wage 
gaps at the mean and across the earnings distribution we are able to shed some new light on the issue of 
labor market segmentation in Ukraine. By eliminating the informal self-employed in agriculture we 
produce evidence that can be better linked to the various schools of thought regarding the role of 
informal employment in the labor market. Slicing the data by gender and age groups helps us in addition 
to draw a refined picture of labor market patterns in Ukraine along the formal-informal divide. 
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 The medium-term transitions presented in panel B of Table 4 give us the clear message that 
formal salaried employment and formal self-employment are especially desirable employment states 
since the estimated duration of state occupancy is very long. When considering the measure of duration 
of state occupancy, the least desirable states are informal dependent employment. What is striking in 
this context it the fact that also workers who are voluntarily in this state do not want to stay in it in the 
medium-term. As far as voluntary and involuntary dependent employees are concerned, the transition 
probabilities indicate that both categories use informal employment as a waiting stage to get into other 
types of employment relationships, foremost formal salaried employment. Those among the voluntary 
informal employees who are not able to end up in formal dependent employment or in formal self-
employment, remain informal employees but now against their volition, hinting at some adverse 
selection for a minority of these workers. The originally involuntary informal employees finish in 
informal self-employment if they cannot enter formal salaried employment. In consequence, on this 
evidence the labor market seems certainly segmented for dependent employees: as found by Pagès and 
Stampini (2009) for Ukraine and Bernabè and Stampini (2009) for Georgia, workers line up in the 
informal state to enter eventually formal employment. 
 The second important message from the transitions analysis concerns the nature of informal self-
employment in the Ukrainian labor market. Clearly, for a large number of the informally self-employed 
this state like dependent informal employment is undesirable, since when we look at the entire sample 
only 18% remain in this state and more than a third find jobs in formal salaried employment. There is, 
however, a substantial number of workers, amounting to 25% in the case of women, who like to remain 
in this state. The dichotomous nature of informal employment between dependent informal employment 
and informal self-emploment, found by Perry et al. (2007) for Latin America and by Maloney (1999, 
2004) for Mexico seems to be less important in the Ukrainian labor market. Since nearly half of the 
informal self-employed enter formal salaried employment or formal self-employment we can moot that 
for a majority of workers in informal self-employment this employment type seems to be a state of last 
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resort that is prefered to unemployment, given the very ungenerous unemployment benefit system (Earle 
and Sakova 2000).19  
The results of the wage gap analysis at the mean in Table 5 seem to point to an integrated 
Ukrainian labor market as far as dependent informal employees are concerned. Voluntary informal 
employees have a return that is 22 percentage points higher than their formal counterparts even when 
we control for unobserved heterogeneity. Those who are involuntarily informal employees have a 
substantial wage penalty that disappears once we control for time-invariant characteristics of these 
workers. So, the reason that we observe a wage penalty at the mean is because these workers have 
relative to formal salaried workers worse unobserved traits. Once we control for them the penalty 
disappears. As we have seen with the medium-term transition probability estimates for the formal self-
employed they like to be in this state. The wage gap estimates at the mean are in line with this scenario 
since the formal self-employed have a substantial mean wage premium that is only slightly lowered in 
the fixed effects regressions. When it comes to the informal self-employed we get some ambivalent 
results. On the one hand, the medium-term transition probabilities demonstrate that the informal self-
employed leave this state and enter formal employment in large numbers. On the other hand, we see a 
wage premium at the mean that does not disappear once we add fixed effects.20 
 The results of the quantile regressions give a rather complex picture regarding the segmentation 
issue. When we look at the results for the involuntary informal employees we see wage penalties in the 
first seven deciles when unobserved heterogeneity is not controlled for (Table 6). Once we control for 
it, wage penalties exist from the first to the eight decile, with the penalties turning, however, 
insignificant at some deciles, including the the median and the ninth decile. The fact, however, remains 
                                                            
19 The relative transition patterns are quite similar whether we look at the entire sample or women and men or age groups 
separately. However, there are some differences. For example, women tend to stay more in informal self-employment, and 
young workers whose origin state is informal employment and who are unable to enter formal salaried employment enter 
unemployment, while older workers who are in the same situation leave the labor force. This latter difference in destination 
states is, of course, reasonable given the different age groups. 
20 The fixed effects point estimates of the wage premia when splitting the data by gender, whilst statistically insignificant, 
are similar to the estimate with the entire sample. Hence, we think that this result is rather due to sample size than to positive 
selection - recall that a reduction in a wage premium once fixed effects are introduced is due to positive selection  
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that even when unobserved time-invariant characteristics are taken into account involuntary informal 
employees get lower earnings than their formal counterparts in most of the distribution. The voluntary 
informal employees, when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity experience wage premia nearly 
throughout the distribution. We establish this scenario also when we estimate fixed effects regressions 
separately for women and men. Finally, both the formal and informal self-employed experience large 
wage premia throughout the distribution. Again, these results are confirmed in the quantile regressions 
that are estimated separately for women and men.  
 As far as involuntary informal employees are concerned, both the mobility analysis and the wage 
gap analysis produce evidence of a segmented labor market. These workers in their majority line up in 
informal employment to eventually enter into formal salaried employment and most of them are 
confronted with wage penalties. For the formal self-employed the results are also clear-cut: in their 
majority, these workers like their employment state  and they receive large earnings premia throughout 
the distribution. A puzzle arises when we confront the results of the mobility analysis with those of the 
wage gap analysis for voluntary informal employees and the informal self-employed. Both types of 
workers line up in informal employment with the clear intention to enter either formal dependent or 
formal self-employment if at all possible, while they do receive large wage premia throughout or 
through most of the distribution. Hence, they do not like to remain in their given state even though their 
remuneration is substantially higher than if they were formal employees. One explanation of this 
seeming contradiction could be that workers in Ukraine value the security of a formal job very highly 
independent of the wages they earn. Tables A7 and A8 provide some descriptive evidence that seems 
to buttress this judgement. Workers in both types of formal employment have the highest job satisfaction 
and life satisfaction scores. On the other hand, involuntary informal employees and the informal self-
employed have far lower scores.   
 So, is there segmentation in the Ukrainian labor market in the years 2003 to 2007?  The answer 
seems an unequivocal yes for involuntary informal employees who make up the majority of dependent 
informal workers. These workers line up for formal employment in the medium term and many of them 
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experience wage penalties even when time-invariant unobserved characteristics are controlled for. For 
voluntary informal employees and the informal self-employed we get a more complex picture. While 
both types of workers also predominantly enter formal salaried employment over a four year period 
most of them  receive large wage premia. So, on one measure we find segmentation along the formal-
informal dimension, while on the measure of the wage gap segmentation is not confirmed. More 
research is certainly needed to address this apparent contradiction. On the other hand, we might surmise 
that the experiences of workers in post-transition countries like Ukraine are far too heterogenous and 
complex to render them easily elements of  a pre-conceived taxonomy.    
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics*  
 Entire Sample Females Males  
FS VI INVI SEF SEI FS VI INVI SEF SEI FS VI INVI SEF SEI 
Mean hourly real 
earnings (in Hryvnia) 2.63 2.77 2.29 4.79 4.04 2.27 2.54 1.9 4.12 3.38 3.08 3.01 2.69 5.35 4.33 
(Std. Dev.) (2.81) (2.72) (2.3) (6.26) (5.57) (2.48) (3.12) (2.06) (3.59) (3.92) (3.1) (2.2) (2.46) (7.81) (6.16) 
Female 0.55 0.52 0.5 0.46 0.39 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Ukrainian 0.74 0.72 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.73 0.69 0.74 0.7 0.74 0.72 0.64 0.69 0.71 
Age 40.14 34.11 33.96 39.89 37.66 40.83 34.88 34.77 40.57 39.29 39.31 33.28 33.14 39.31 36.61 
Marital status                
Married 0.72 0.59 0.53 0.81 0.69 0.68 0.58 0.5 0.78 0.74 0.78 0.6 0.56 0.83 0.65 
Single 0.13 0.26 0.3 0.09 0.2 0.11 0.24 0.24 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.28 0.36 0.09 0.25 
Divorced or other status 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.12 0.21 0.18 0.26 0.13 0.15 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.1 
Household characteristics                
Average household size 3.58 3.79 3.7 3.62 3.72 3.5 3.63 3.56 3.63 3.59 3.67 3.96 3.83 3.62 3.8 
Average number of other 
family members in 
formal sector 0.75 0.65 0.62 0.47 0.46 0.71 0.7 0.54 0.55 0.42 0.81 0.6 0.71 0.41 0.49 
Number of Dependent 
children 0.28 0.33 0.3 0.38 0.33 0.28 0.35 0.36 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.25 0.46 0.34 
Education                
Basic elementary and less 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.17 0.10 0.03 0.08 
Vocational and 
secondary 0.75 0.78 0.86 0.72 0.81 0.71 0.77 0.85 0.78 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.87 0.66 0.80 
Higher 0.22 0.14 0.06 0.26 0.11 0.26 0.21 0.09 0.22 0.10 0.18 0.05 0.03 0.30 0.11 
Sector                
Agriculture, hunting and 
fishing 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.39 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.52 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.31 
Industrya 0.27 0.13 0.16 0.04 0.04 0.20 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.37 0.18 0.21 0.07 0.05 
Construction 0.04 0.22 0.13 0.04 0.23 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.42 0.24 0.05 0.36 
Trade, Hotels and 
Restaurants 0.1 0.4 0.45 0.65 0.16 0.12 0.62 0.62 0.81 0.22 0.08 0.17 0.27 0.53 0.13 
Other Servicesb 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.20 0.14 0.18 0.26 0.14 
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 Entire Sample Females Males  
FS VI INVI SEF SEI FS VI INVI SEF SEI FS VI INVI SEF SEI 
Education, Health and 
Social protection 0.25 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.38 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Public administration 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Firm Size                
Less than 5 0.05 0.36 0.31 0.86 0.88 0.07 0.38 0.43 0.88 0.96 0.03 0.33 0.19 0.84 0.82 
5-49 0.30 0.52 0.50 0.09 0.08 0.34 0.50 0.45 0.05 0.01 0.25 0.55 0.55 0.12 0.13 
50-249 0.30 0.10 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.29 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.31 0.12 0.21 0.03 0.01 
250-999 0.17 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 
1000+ 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.04 
Macro-Regions                
Kyiv 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 
Center North 0.23 0.17 0.18 0.28 0.31 0.23 0.12 0.17 0.26 0.29 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.30 0.32 
East 0.38 0.38 0.42 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.42 0.44 0.36 0.31 0.40 0.35 0.40 0.36 0.31 
South 0.13 0.12 0.23 0.16 0.26 0.14 0.10 0.21 0.13 0.29 0.13 0.15 0.26 0.18 0.24 
West 0.20 0.24 0.13 0.17 0.10 0.20 0.25 0.14 0.22 0.07 0.19 0.23 0.13 0.13 0.11 
Number of Observations 6817 162 434 281 275 3736 84 219 129 108 3081 78 215 152 167 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ULMS. 
*  averaged over 2003, 2004 and 2007. 
a  Includes: Mining and Manufacturing. 
b  Includes: Energy gas water; Transportation; Financial and real estate; Other services. 
Legend: FS – Formal Salaried; VI – Voluntary Informal Salaried; INVI – Involuntary Informal Salaried; SEF Self-Employed Formal; SEI – Self-Employed Informal. 
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Table 2. Multinomial Logit of Workers’ Status – Odds Ratios  
 VI INVI SEF SEI 
Demographics: Ref. Male, Non-Ukrainian, Not Married 
Female 0.984 0.806 0.249*** 0.450*** 
 (0.190) (0.109) (0.052) (0.095) 
Ukrainian 0.868 0.864 0.876 0.809 
 (0.189) (0.122) (0.197) (0.186) 
Age 0.882** 0.905** 1.055 0.918 
 (0.056) (0.039) (0.074) (0.065) 
Age squared/100 1.131 1.097 0.942 1.096 
 (0.097) (0.063) (0.085) (0.102) 
Married 0.845 0.624*** 1.794** 0.870 
 (0.188) (0.093) (0.433) (0.201) 
Average household size 1.084 1.078 1.001 1.269*** 
 (0.091) (0.050) (0.079) (0.100) 
Av. n. of other family members in formal sector  0.790* 0.760*** 0.653*** 0.571*** 
 (0.100) (0.063) (0.089) (0.079) 
Number of dependent children 1.152 1.162 1.181 0.729 
 (0.261) (0.189) (0.263) (0.181) 
Education: Ref. Basic elementary and less 
Vocational and secondary 0.543 0.631** 0.853 0.700 
 (0.203) (0.133) (0.398) (0.269) 
Higher 0.478* 0.241*** 2.434* 0.700 
 (0.206) (0.070) (1.215) (0.316) 
Sector: Ref. Agriculture, Hunting and Fishing 
Industrya  0.999 1.177 0.330** 0.046*** 
 (0.407) (0.296) (0.175) (0.021) 
Construction  4.455*** 2.469*** 1.399 1.501 
 (1.635) (0.641) (0.672) (0.440) 
Trade, Hotels and Restaurants 1.488 2.110*** 4.194*** 0.093*** 
 (0.505) (0.477) (1.412) (0.028) 
Servicesb 0.578 0.767 0.948 0.099*** 
 (0.211) (0.183) (0.337) (0.027) 
Education, Health and Social protection 0.047*** 0.081*** 0.140** 0.018*** 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.108) (0.010) 
Public administration 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Size: Ref. Less than 5 
5-49 0.251*** 0.326*** 0.019*** 0.009*** 
 (0.054) (0.050) (0.004) (0.002) 
50-249 0.059*** 0.122*** 0.007*** 0.002*** 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.003) (0.001) 
250-999 0.006*** 0.030*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.003) (0.001) 
1000+ 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.017*** 0.008*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) 
Macro-Region: Ref. Kyiv 
Center North 0.348*** 0.832 2.061 0.948 
 (0.142) (0.280) (1.139) (0.543) 
East 0.702 1.678 2.305 1.091 
 (0.255) (0.538) (1.266) (0.640) 
South 0.422** 1.775* 2.240 0.999 
 (0.175) (0.597) (1.277) (0.612) 
West 0.612 0.788 1.926 0.366* 
 (0.238) (0.272) (1.137) (0.223) 
Pseudo R2  0.41  N. Obs. 7,969 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ULMS data.  
Clustered standard errors (individual level) in parentheses - * significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1% 
a  Includes: Mining and Manufacturing; b  Includes: Energy gas water; Transportation; Financial and real estate; Other services. 
Legend: VI – Voluntary Informal Salaried; INVI – Involuntary Informal Salaried; SEF Self-Employed Formal; SEI – 
Self-Employed Informal  NOTE: Multinomial logit with base outcome = being a formal salaried worker. 
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Table 3. Transition matrices (entire sample – with (A) and without (B) round-trippers):  
2003-2004 
A. 2003-2004 
       
  FS VI INVI SEF SEI UN OLF Pi. 
FS 0.86 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.49 
  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01   
VI 0.36 0.25 0.27 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.01 
  0.07 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02   
INVI 0.26 0.03 0.43 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.02 
  0.04 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03   
SEF 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.79 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.02 
  0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02   
SEI 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.48 0.15 0.08 0.01 
  0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.04   
UN 0.26 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.34 0.24 0.13 
  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02   
OLF 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.74 0.32 
  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01   
P.j 0.50 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.30   
N 5,103        
 
B. 2003-2004 
       
  FS VI INVI SEF SEI UN OLF Pi. 
FS 0.85 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.48 
  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01   
VI 0.39 0.20 0.29 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.01 
  0.07 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03   
INVI 0.28 0.03 0.40 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.02 
  0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03   
SEF 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.78 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.02 
  0.03 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02   
SEI 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.43 0.16 0.09 0.01 
  0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.03   
UN 0.27 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.33 0.25 0.13 
  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02   
OLF 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.73 0.33 
  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01   
P.j 0.49 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.31   
N 4,903        
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ULMS.  
Legend: FS – Formal Salaried; VI – Voluntary Informal Salaried; INVI – Involuntary Informal Salaried; SEF 
Self-Employed Formal; SEI – Self-Employed Informal.  
Notes: Standard errors in Italic, bootstrapped with 1000 repetitions.  
“Round-trippers” are persons who leave and return to the origin state over the given period.  
Pi. is the relative size of a sector at the beginning of the period; 
P.j is the relative size of a sector at the end of a period. 
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Table 4. Transition matrices (entire sample – with (A) and without (B) round-trippers): 2003-2007 
A. 2003-2007 
       
  FS VI INVI SEF SEI UN OLF Pi. 
FS 0.77 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.13 0.52 
  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01   
VI 0.43 0.11 0.20 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.01 
  0.08 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04   
INVI 0.38 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.16 0.02 
  0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04   
SEF 0.13 0.01 0.05 0.67 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.02 
  0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.03   
SEI 0.31 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.31 0.08 0.10 0.01 
  0.07 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.05   
UN 0.39 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.29 0.12 
  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02   
OLF 0.32 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.48 0.30 
  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01   
P.j 0.56 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.25   
N 3,935        
 
B. 2003-2007 
       
  FS VI INVI SEF SEI UN OLF Pi. 
FS 0.71 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.17 0.48 
  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01   
VI 0.49 0.00 0.23 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.01 
  0.08 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.04   
INVI 0.42 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.18 0.02 
  0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05   
SEF 0.15 0.02 0.06 0.62 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.02 
  0.04 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.04   
SEI 0.36 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.18 0.09 0.12 0.01 
  0.09 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06   
UN 0.43 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.32 0.14 
  0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02   
OLF 0.36 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.41 0.32 
  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01   
P.j 0.54 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.26   
N 3,273        
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ULMS.  
Legend: FS – Formal Salaried; VI – Voluntary Informal Salaried; INVI – Involuntary Informal Salaried; SEF 
Self-Employed Formal; SEI – Self-Employed Informal.  
Notes: Standard errors in Italic, bootstrapped with 1000 repetitions.  
“Round-trippers” are persons who leave and return to the origin state over the given period.  
Pi. is the relative size of a sector at the beginning of the period; 
P.j is the relative size of a sector at the end of a period. 
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Table 5. Determinants of log hourly real earnings – OLS and Fixed Effects: 2003-2007 
 Entire Sample Women Men 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled OLS 
with Heckman 
correction 
Fixed Effects Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled OLS 
with Heckman 
correction 
Fixed Effects Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled OLS 
with Heckman 
correction 
Fixed Effects 
Female -0.252*** -0.259***        
 (0.015) (0.021)        
Ukrainian -0.035** -0.035**  -0.043** -0.043**  -0.026 -0.027  
 (0.017) (0.014)  (0.021) (0.017)  (0.027) (0.023)  
Age 0.013*** 0.019 0.265*** 0.013* 0.013 0.278*** 0.009 0.010 0.250*** 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.017) (0.007) (0.016) (0.024) (0.007) (0.018) (0.025) 
Age Squared/100 -0.019*** -0.027 -0.093*** -0.017* -0.017 -0.103*** -0.018* -0.019 -0.081*** 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.020) (0.009) (0.020) (0.026) (0.009) (0.024) (0.031) 
Vocational and Secondary 0.019 0.035 -0.023 0.004 0.002 -0.059 0.046 0.057 0.004 
 (0.037) (0.044) (0.075) (0.052) (0.053) (0.071) (0.049) (0.068) (0.110) 
Higher 0.298*** 0.325*** 0.185 0.327*** 0.326*** 0.200 0.260*** 0.274*** 0.123 
 (0.042) (0.065) (0.114) (0.057) (0.069) (0.136) (0.058) (0.094) (0.167) 
Tenure 0.010*** 0.010*** -0.006 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.010* 0.009** 0.009** 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Tenure Squared/100 -0.019** -0.019*** 0.011 -0.018* -0.018** 0.020 -0.016 -0.016 -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.019) 
Part Time 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.206*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.181*** 0.084 0.083 0.257** 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.051) (0.044) (0.042) (0.054) (0.082) (0.077) (0.112) 
Married 0.028* 0.027* 0.036 -0.009 -0.009 0.039 0.111*** 0.114** 0.019 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.035) (0.019) (0.020) (0.043) (0.028) (0.052) (0.057) 
Voluntary Informal 0.155*** 0.148*** 0.199* 0.164** 0.146** 0.184 0.138** 0.144** 0.231 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.112) (0.074) (0.069) (0.152) (0.069) (0.072) (0.173) 
Involuntary Informal -0.066** -0.064** -0.074 -0.053 -0.050 -0.035 -0.076 -0.075 -0.150* 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.051) (0.043) (0.041) (0.062) (0.046) (0.046) (0.085) 
Self-Employed Formal 0.417*** 0.422*** 0.371*** 0.502*** 0.514*** 0.290** 0.358*** 0.360*** 0.480** 
 (0.054) (0.051) (0.116) (0.070) (0.069) (0.133) (0.083) (0.080) (0.209) 
Self-Employed Informal 0.312*** 0.312*** 0.319** 0.336*** 0.338*** 0.228 0.269*** 0.269*** 0.311 
 (0.066) (0.061) (0.144) (0.115) (0.108) (0.203) (0.084) (0.078) (0.189) 
Lambda  0.038   -0.005   0.016  
  (0.088)   (0.077)   (0.147)  
Additional controls a YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  0.43  0.52 0.44  0.54 0.40  0.50 
N 7,486 7,469 7,486 4,041 4,031 4,041 3,445 3,438 3,445 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ULMS data 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (OLS and Fixed Effects) 
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Standard errors for the two-step Heckman selection model have been obtained by bootstrapping (1,000 repetitions). 
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1% 
a Back pay of wage arrears or other unexpected increase in monthly earnings, wage arrears or other unexpected decrease in monthly earnings, occupation controls, sector controls, firm 
size controls and ownership controls. 
Default categories are: Male, Non-Ukrainian, Basic Elementary and Less Education, Full Time, Formal Salaried, Agriculture Hunting and Fishing, Less than 5 employees, ISCO-CODES 
1-3, New Private Enterprise, Kyiv City. 
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Table 6. Employment status and log hourly real earnings – Pooled Quantile Regressions: 2003-2007 
 q10 q20 q30 q40 q50 q60 q70 q80 q90 
 Entire sample (7,486 obs.) 
Voluntary Informal 0.024 0.053 0.090 0.117** 0.097* 0.164** 0.179*** 0.264*** 0.205 
 (0.069) (0.082) (0.067) (0.051) (0.054) (0.068) (0.067) (0.085) (0.125) 
Involuntary Informal -0.119*** -0.163*** -0.118*** -0.119*** -0.083** -0.064* -0.066* -0.028 0.008 
 (0.045) (0.039) (0.032) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.049) (0.067) 
Self-Employed Formal 0.153** 0.247*** 0.331*** 0.408*** 0.428*** 0.471*** 0.521*** 0.566*** 0.604*** 
 (0.075) (0.067) (0.090) (0.054) (0.071) (0.054) (0.061) (0.063) (0.137) 
Self-Employed Informal 0.079 0.154* 0.221*** 0.242*** 0.258*** 0.328*** 0.406*** 0.402*** 0.520*** 
 (0.090) (0.087) (0.075) (0.072) (0.070) (0.084) (0.089) (0.070) (0.156) 
 Women (4,041 obs.) 
Voluntary Informal -0.011 -0.045 0.068 0.144 0.144** 0.169** 0.169* 0.228** 0.258 
 (0.092) (0.095) (0.109) (0.094) (0.072) (0.074) (0.093) (0.108) (0.176) 
Involuntary Informal -0.033 -0.135*** -0.134*** -0.113** -0.095* -0.047 -0.058 -0.075 0.104 
 (0.066) (0.045) (0.043) (0.050) (0.052) (0.054) (0.051) (0.071) (0.096) 
Self-Employed Formal 0.258*** 0.279*** 0.389*** 0.423*** 0.478*** 0.590*** 0.577*** 0.627*** 0.798*** 
 (0.093) (0.082) (0.113) (0.083) (0.079) (0.076) (0.099) (0.085) (0.172) 
Self-Employed Informal -0.040 0.092 0.133 0.132 0.304* 0.383** 0.507*** 0.643*** 0.693*** 
 (0.154) (0.137) (0.119) (0.172) (0.181) (0.169) (0.155) (0.170) (0.189) 
 Men (3,445 obs.) 
Voluntary Informal 0.027 0.046 0.104 0.102 0.108 0.097 0.105 0.257** 0.221 
 (0.113) (0.099) (0.090) (0.087) (0.086) (0.103) (0.116) (0.107) (0.151) 
Involuntary Informal -0.132** -0.133** -0.108** -0.089 -0.097 -0.024 -0.070 -0.005 -0.017 
 (0.061) (0.067) (0.054) (0.060) (0.063) (0.058) (0.058) (0.062) (0.080) 
Self-Employed Formal -0.000 0.110 0.266** 0.398*** 0.412*** 0.442*** 0.486*** 0.498*** 0.492*** 
 (0.133) (0.108) (0.113) (0.112) (0.088) (0.091) (0.092) (0.082) (0.151) 
Self-Employed Informal 0.125 0.078 0.183* 0.301*** 0.296*** 0.235*** 0.315*** 0.275*** 0.283* 
 (0.118) (0.103) (0.105) (0.115) (0.086) (0.089) (0.100) (0.097) (0.170) 
Demographic controlsa YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Additional controls b YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ULMS data. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (1,000 repetitions). 
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%. 
a Female, Ukrainian, Age, Age Squared/10, Vocational and Secondary Education, Higher Education, Tenure, Tenure Squared/100, Part-Time, Married. 
b Back pay of wage arrears or other unexpected increase in monthly earnings, wage arrears or other unexpected decrease in monthly earnings, occupation controls, sector controls, firm 
size controls and ownership controls. 
Default categories are: Male, Non-Ukrainian, Basic Elementary and Less Education, Full Time, Not Married, Formal Salaried, Agriculture Hunting and Fishing, Less than 5 employees, 
ISCO-CODES 1-3, New Private Enterprise, Kyiv City.  
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Table 7. Employment status and log hourly real earnings – Fixed Effects Quantile Regressions: 2003-2007 
 q10 q20 q30 q40 q50 q60 q70 q80 q90 
 Entire sample (7,486 obs.) 
Voluntary Informal 0.015 0.184*** 0.197*** 0.066** 0.235*** 0.065 0.293*** 0.071** 0.206** 
 (0.050) (0.057) (0.013) (0.030) (0.050) (0.102) (0.067) (0.034) (0.102) 
Involuntary Informal -0.068*** -0.055 -0.035* -0.163*** -0.011 -0.022 -0.105*** -0.093*** 0.032 
 (0.021) (0.040) (0.019) (0.038) (0.022) (0.026) (0.030) (0.023) (0.041) 
Self-Employed Formal 0.286*** 0.316*** 0.516*** 0.572*** 0.564*** 0.550*** 0.296** 0.619*** 0.580*** 
 (0.045) (0.032) (0.023) (0.019) (0.074) (0.076) (0.128) (0.040) (0.079) 
Self-Employed Informal 0.372*** 0.215*** 0.458*** 0.434*** 0.437*** 0.456*** 0.675*** 0.389*** 0.468*** 
 (0.129) (0.046) (0.046) (0.033) (0.080) (0.040) (0.074) (0.067) (0.076) 
 Women (4,041 obs.) 
Voluntary Informal -0.015 -0.117*** 0.110*** 0.163*** 0.289*** 0.084** 0.241*** -0.018 0.386*** 
 (0.030) (0.026) (0.042) (0.026) (0.042) (0.041) (0.036) (0.097) (0.059) 
Involuntary Informal -0.017 0.044 -0.065* -0.108** -0.090*** -0.109*** -0.009 -0.171*** -0.074*** 
 (0.015) (0.063) (0.037) (0.055) (0.025) (0.023) (0.037) (0.064) (0.025) 
Self-Employed Formal 0.255*** 0.240*** 0.608*** 0.622*** 0.594*** 0.664*** 0.801*** 0.587*** 0.543*** 
 (0.050) (0.078) (0.046) (0.032) (0.041) (0.050) (0.024) (0.071) (0.084) 
Self-Employed Informal 0.123** 0.380*** 0.288*** 0.260*** 0.234*** 0.495*** 0.389*** 0.424*** 0.402*** 
 (0.052) (0.135) (0.041) (0.040) (0.031) (0.020) (0.017) (0.066) (0.090) 
 Men (3,445 obs.) 
Voluntary Informal 0.201*** 0.325*** 0.347*** 0.182*** 0.134*** 0.074*** -0.000 -0.056 0.183* 
 (0.064) (0.056) (0.066) (0.049) (0.048) (0.026) (0.102) (0.063) (0.101) 
Involuntary Informal -0.043 -0.084*** -0.186*** -0.135*** 0.061 0.028 -0.033 -0.037 -0.048 
 (0.032) (0.030) (0.038) (0.024) (0.057) (0.028) (0.050) (0.078) (0.059) 
Self-Employed Formal 0.136** 0.274*** 0.233*** 0.367*** 0.424*** 0.434*** 0.394*** 0.537*** 0.591*** 
 (0.064) (0.037) (0.036) (0.018) (0.030) (0.050) (0.092) (0.048) (0.082) 
Self-Employed Informal 0.169 0.337*** 0.427*** 0.391*** 0.423*** 0.330*** 0.440*** 0.409*** 0.346*** 
 (0.147) (0.032) (0.076) (0.030) (0.016) (0.045) (0.053) (0.063) (0.063) 
Demographic controlsa YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Additional controls b YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ULMS data. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (1,000 repetitions). 
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1% 
a Age, Age Squared/10, Vocational and Secondary Education, Higher Education, Tenure, Tenure Squared/100, Part-Time, Married. 
b Back pay of wage arrears or other unexpected increase in monthly earnings, wage arrears or other unexpected decrease in monthly earnings, occupation controls, sector controls, firm 
size controls and ownership controls. 
Default categories are: Basic Elementary and Less Education, Full Time, Not-Married Formal Salaried, Agriculture Hunting and Fishing, Less than 5 employees, ISCO-CODES 1-3, New 
Private Enterprise, Kyiv City.
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FIGURES – EARNINGS DISTRIBUTIONS  
Figure 1. Log real hourly earnings – entire sample – years 2003, 2004 and 2007 
 
Figure 2. Log real hourly earnings by employment status – entire sample – 2003 
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Figure 3. Log real hourly earnings by employment status – entire sample – 2004 
 
Figure 4. Log real hourly earnings by employment status – entire sample – 2007 
 
Legend: FS – Formal Salaried; VI – Voluntary Informal; INVI – Involuntary Informal; SEF Self-Employed 
Formal; SEI – Self-Employed Informal
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Appendix 
Table A1. Employment status by sector and gender* 
 
FS % VI % INVI % SEF % SEI % TOTAL % 
Total sample             
Agriculture, hunting and fishing 475 0.07 12 0.07 33 0.08 16 0.06 108 0.39 644 0.08 
Industrya 1869 0.27 21 0.13 69 0.16 11 0.04 10 0.04 1980 0.25 
Construction  288 0.04 36 0.22 55 0.13 10 0.04 64 0.23 453 0.06 
Trade, Hotels and Restaurants 668 0.1 65 0.4 195 0.45 184 0.65 45 0.16 1157 0.15 
Other Servicesb 1246 0.18 26 0.16 75 0.17 55 0.2 44 0.16 1446 0.18 
Education, Health and Social protection 1701 0.25 2 0.01 7 0.02 5 0.02 4 0.01 1719 0.22 
Public administration 570 0.08 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 570 0.07 
Number of Observations 6817  162  434  281  275  7969  
Females             
Agriculture, hunting and fishing 203 0.05 5 0.06 14 0.06 3 0.02 56 0.52 281 0.07 
Industrya 740 0.2 7 0.08 24 0.11 1 0.01 1 0.01 773 0.18 
Construction  66 0.02 3 0.04 3 0.01 2 0.02 4 0.04 78 0.02 
Trade, Hotels and Restaurants 434 0.12 52 0.62 136 0.62 104 0.81 24 0.22 750 0.18 
Other Servicesb 623 0.17 15 0.18 36 0.16 15 0.12 21 0.19 710 0.17 
Education, Health and Social protection 1401 0.38 2 0.02 6 0.03 4 0.03 2 0.02 1415 0.33 
Public administration 269 0.07 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 269 0.06 
Number of Observations 3736  84  219  129  108  4276  
Males             
Agriculture, hunting and fishing 272 0.09 7 0.09 19 0.09 13 0.09 52 0.31 363 0.1 
Industrya 1129 0.37 14 0.18 45 0.21 10 0.07 9 0.05 1207 0.33 
Construction  222 0.07 33 0.42 52 0.24 8 0.05 60 0.36 375 0.1 
Trade, Hotels and Restaurants 234 0.08 13 0.17 59 0.27 80 0.53 21 0.13 407 0.11 
Other Servicesb 623 0.2 11 0.14 39 0.18 40 0.26 23 0.14 736 0.2 
Education, Health and Social protection 300 0.1 0 0 1 0 1 0.01 2 0.01 304 0.08 
Public administration 301 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 301 0.08 
Number of Observations 3081  78  215  152  167  3693  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ULMS.  
*  averaged over 2003, 2004 and 2007.  
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a.Includes: Mining and Manufacturing. 
b  Includes: Energy gas water; Transportation; Financial and real estate; Other services.  
Legend: FS – Formal Salaried; VI – Voluntary Informal Salaried; INVI – Involuntary Informal Salaried; SEF Self-Employed Formal; SEI – Self-Employed Informal 
 
l.
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Table A2. Transition matrices (women – with (A) and without (B) round-trippers): 2003-2004 
A. 2003-2004 
       
  FS VI INVI SEF SEI UN OLF Pi. 
FS 0.87 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.46 
  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01   
VI 0.34 0.22 0.31 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.01 
  0.09 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.04   
INVI 0.22 0.02 0.47 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.11 0.02 
  0.06 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.04   
SEF 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.79 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.01 
  0.04 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.05   
SEI 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.44 0.17 0.11 0.01 
  0.06 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.08   
UN 0.26 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.33 0.31 0.11 
  0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03   
OLF 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.76 0.38 
  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01   
P.j 0.47 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.36   
N 2,975        
 
B. 2003-2004 
       
  FS VI INVI SEF SEI UN OLF Pi. 
FS 0.86 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.46 
  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01   
VI 0.35 0.19 0.32 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.01 
  0.09 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.05   
INVI 0.23 0.02 0.44 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.12 0.02 
  0.06 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.05   
SEF 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.78 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.01 
  0.04 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.06   
SEI 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.44 0.17 0.11 0.01 
  0.05 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.08   
UN 0.26 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.31 0.31 0.11 
  0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03   
OLF 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.76 0.39 
  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01   
P.j 0.47 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.37   
N 2,897        
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ULMS.  
Legend: FS – Formal Salaried; VI – Voluntary Informal Salaried; INVI – Involuntary Informal Salaried; SEF 
Self-Employed Formal; SEI – Self-Employed Informal.  
Notes: Standard errors in Italic, bootstrapped with 1000 repetitions.  
“Round-trippers” are persons who leave and return to the origin state over the given period.  
Pi. is the relative size of a sector at the beginning of the period; 
P.j is the relative size of a sector at the end of a period. 
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Table A3. Transition matrices (men – with (A) and without (B) round-trippers): 2003-2004 
A. 2003-2004 
       
  FS VI INVI SEF SEI UN OLF Pi. 
FS 0.86 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.53 
  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01   
VI 0.39 0.30 0.22 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
  0.10 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00   
INVI 0.31 0.04 0.39 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.02 
  0.07 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04   
SEF 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.02 
  0.03 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02   
SEI 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.49 0.14 0.07 0.02 
  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.04   
UN 0.27 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.36 0.17 0.15 
  0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02   
OLF 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.68 0.24 
  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02   
P.j 0.54 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.22   
N 2,128        
 
B. 2003-2004 
       
  FS VI INVI SEF SEI UN OLF Pi. 
FS 0.85 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.51 
  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01   
VI 0.45 0.20 0.25 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
  0.11 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00   
INVI 0.33 0.04 0.35 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.02 
  0.07 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04   
SEF 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.03 
  0.03 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02   
SEI 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.42 0.16 0.08 0.02 
  0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.05   
UN 0.28 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.35 0.18 0.15 
  0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02   
OLF 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.67 0.26 
  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02   
P.j 0.52 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.23   
N 2,006        
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ULMS.  
Legend: FS – Formal Salaried; VI – Voluntary Informal Salaried; INVI – Involuntary Informal Salaried; SEF 
Self-Employed Formal; SEI – Self-Employed Informal.  
Notes: Standard errors in Italic, bootstrapped with 1000 repetitions.  
“Round-trippers” are persons who leave and return to the origin state over the given period.  
Pi. is the relative size of a sector at the beginning of the period; 
P.j is the relative size of a sector at the end of a period. 
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Table A4. Transition matrices (women – with (A) and without (B) round-trippers): 2003-2007 
A. 2003-2007 
       
  FS VI INVI SEF SEI UN OLF Pi. 
FS 0.76 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.49 
  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01   
VI 0.48 0.04 0.30 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.01 
  0.11 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.05   
INVI 0.38 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.22 0.02 
  0.07 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.07   
SEF 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.67 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.01 
  0.04 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.05   
SEI 0.24 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.29 0.06 0.18 0.01 
  0.10 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.09   
UN 0.39 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.37 0.11 
  0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03   
OLF 0.29 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.53 0.35 
  0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02   
P.j 0.53 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.32   
N 2,332        
 
B. 2003-2007 
       
  FS VI INVI SEF SEI UN OLF Pi. 
FS 0.70 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.21 0.46 
  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01   
VI 0.50 0.00 0.32 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.01 
  0.11 0.00 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06   
INVI 0.41 0.07 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.24 0.02 
  0.07 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.07   
SEF 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.61 0.04 0.00 0.14 0.01 
  0.06 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.07   
SEI 0.25 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.25 0.06 0.19 0.01 
  0.11 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.09   
UN 0.41 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.39 0.12 
  0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03   
OLF 0.33 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.47 0.36 
  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02   
P.j 0.51 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.32   
N 1,994        
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ULMS.  
Legend: FS – Formal Salaried; VI – Voluntary Informal Salaried; INVI – Involuntary Informal Salaried; SEF 
Self-Employed Formal; SEI – Self-Employed Informal.  
Notes: Standard errors in Italic, bootstrapped with 1000 repetitions.  
“Round-trippers” are persons who leave and return to the origin state over the given period.  
Pi. is the relative size of a sector at the beginning of the period; 
P.j is the relative size of a sector at the end of a period. 
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Table A5. Transition matrices (men – with (A) and without (B) round-trippers): 2003-2007 
A. 2003-2007 
       
  FS VI INVI SEF SEI UN OLF Pi. 
FS 0.79 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.56 
  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01   
VI 0.38 0.19 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.01 
  0.11 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04   
INVI 0.37 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.17 0.09 0.09 0.02 
  0.08 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.05   
SEF 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.67 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.03 
  0.06 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.04   
SEI 0.36 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.32 0.09 0.05 0.01 
  0.11 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.04   
UN 0.40 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.15 
  0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03   
OLF 0.40 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.36 0.22 
  0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02   
P.j 0.61 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.16   
N 1,603        
 
B. 2003-2007 
       
  FS VI INVI SEF SEI UN OLF Pi. 
FS 0.71 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.51 
  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01   
VI 0.47 0.00 0.12 0.18 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.01 
  0.13 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06   
INVI 0.43 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.02 
  0.09 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.06   
SEF 0.19 0.03 0.03 0.62 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.03 
  0.06 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.04   
SEI 0.47 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.01 
  0.12 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06   
UN 0.44 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.23 0.16 
  0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03   
OLF 0.44 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.30 0.25 
  0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03   
P.j 0.57 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.17   
N 1,279        
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ULMS.  
Legend: FS – Formal Salaried; VI – Voluntary Informal Salaried; INVI – Involuntary Informal Salaried; SEF 
Self-Employed Formal; SEI – Self-Employed Informal.  
Notes: Standard errors in Italic, bootstrapped with 1000 repetitions.  
“Round-trippers” are persons who leave and return to the origin state over the given period.  
Pi. is the relative size of a sector at the beginning of the period; 
P.j is the relative size of a sector at the end of a period. 
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Table A6. Individuals switching employment status and sector in the three waves, entire sample and by 
gender 
 
Employment 
status 
Switchers 
% of people 
initially in 
status 
Employment 
Status and 
Sector 
Switchers 
% of people 
initially in 
status 
Ratio of Status 
and Sector 
Switchers to 
Status 
Switchers 
All      
FS 247 4.5% 145 2.7% 0.59 
VI 96 82.1% 36 30.8% 0.38 
INVI 178 67.2% 94 35.5% 0.53 
SEF 61 26.5% 27 11.7% 0.44 
SEI 78 61.4% 37 29.1% 0.47 
TOTAL 660 10.7% 339 5.5% 0.51 
Females      
FS 100 3.4% 58 2.0% 0.58 
VI 47 82.5% 15 26.3% 0.32 
INVI 85 65.9% 45 34.9% 0.53 
SEF 25 26.9% 10 10.8% 0.40 
SEI 18 56.3% 6 18.8% 0.33 
TOTAL 275 8.4% 134 4.1% 0.49 
Males      
FS 147 5.9% 87 3.5% 0.59 
VI 49 81.7% 21 35.0% 0.43 
INVI 93 68.4% 49 36.0% 0.53 
SEF 36 26.3% 17 12.4% 0.47 
SEI 60 63.2% 31 32.6% 0.52 
TOTAL 385 13.2% 205 7.1% 0.53 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ULMS.  
Legend: FS – Formal Salaried; VI – Voluntary Informal Salaried; INVI – Involuntary Informal Salaried; SEF 
Self-Employed Formal; SEI – Self-Employed Informal.  
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Table A7. Job satisfaction by employment status 
 
2003 2004 2007 
Formal Salaried 73.1 79.0 66.9 
Voluntary Informal 60.3 60.2 56.6 
Involuntary Informal 55.7 63.3 37.3 
Self-Employed Formal 78.4 79.2 79.4 
Self-Employed Informal 56.1 48.8 42.2 
Note: individuals are classified as “satisfied” if they report to be rather satisfied or above. 
Table A8. Life satisfaction by labor market status 
 
2003 2004 2007 
Formal Salaried 47.0 61.0 43.5 
Voluntary Informal 50.6 57.5 31.3 
Involuntary Informal 37.1 45.1 31.7 
Self-Employed Formal 56.8 71.2 59.2 
Self-Employed Informal 42.5 37.2 30.7 
Unemployed 29.6 31.3 21.6 
Out of Labor Force 50.5 56.0 42.7 
Note: individuals are classified as “satisfied” if they report to be rather satisfied or above. 
Source: ULMS. 
 
 
